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In this paper, Professor Boonin-Vail has made many 
points that we must certainly attend to in our efforts 
to identify the proper relation between ourselves and 
animals. He has also raised questions about the results 
of contract theory that may lead some to skepticism 
about its usefulness as a tool in applied ethics. The 
justifiability of such skepticism is a large question that 
I shall not try to resolve. For, fortunately for me, 
Boonin-Vail has made my job as commentator much 
easier than that. He has done so by setting himself a 
task that is extremely difficult. His approach is to 
concede, for the sake of the argument, a great deal to 
Carruthers, and then to show that, even with the 
concessions, he can force Carruthers into a number of 
dilemmas, in which Carruthers must either settle for 
less than he claims, or concede more than he allows. 
My comments will be confined to the narrow question 
of whether Boonin-Vail has succeeded in hoisting 
Carruthers with his own petard. 
Boonin-Vail considers three main arguments. In each 
case, there is some distinction at stake. If Carruthers 
can make the distinction in a principled way, then he 
can satisfy common intuitions about treatment of 
animals for cases on one side of the distinction, while 
refusing to extend that treatment to cases on the other 
side of the distinction. However, if he cannot make the 
distinction in a principled way, then he must either give 
up the common intuition, or allow for the extension to 
a wider class of cases than he wishes. It will be 
convenient, therefore, to think of Boonin-Vail as arguing 
that certain distinctions are not available to Carruthers 
in a principled way. Correlatively, the critical points I 
shall make all have one of two forms. They either 
suggest how Carruthers might be able to make the 
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distinction in a principled way after all; or they suggest 
that, at least, Boonin-Vail has not shown that Carruthers 
cannot have his distinction in a principled way. 
The first distinction is between public and private 
animal suffering. Carruthers accepts that contractors 
would agree to prohibit public exhibitions of acts that 
cause animal suffering, but he holds that they would 
not agree to prohibit acts with similar consequences, 
so long as they were done out of the public view. 
Boonin-Vail does not believe that this distinction can 
be maintained. He argues that a contractor who would 
object to having to witness the kicking of a dog would 
also object to factory fanning, no matter how hidden. 
This seems immensely plausible, perhaps because 
in general, the morality of an action is not affected by 
whether others know about it. But if we hew austerely 
to contractualism, as the terms of Boonin-Vail's critique 
require us to do, then I believe that we can make a 
distinction at the place where Carruthers needs it. To 
do this, an analogy will be helpful. So, let us consider 
the extreme reaction that some people have to the sight 
of their own blood. This reaction can unnerve them to 
the point of interfering with tending to their injury. The 
key point is that this emotional reaction can take place, 
even when they are well aware that their injury is quite 
superficial and therefore not dangerous at all. This 
shows that we can separate the emotional reaction due 
to actual confrontation (which is great in this case) from 
the reaction one might have to the mere thought of 
something (which would be mild in the absence of the 
confrontation). Armed with this distinction, we can 
imagine that contractors might agree to rules that enable 
them to avoid confrontation with upsetting scenes, but 
not to rules that prohibit activities that do not risk 
causing such confrontations. 
Boonin-Vail makes a perfectly natural move here 
by replying, in effect, that contractors will also want to 
avoid the distress of having to think about what goes 
on behind the walls of the confinement building. But 
here is where I need to make the essential point of my 
criticism of tllis case: This reply seems so natural 
because we are apt to imagine contractors as having a 
moral repugnance to factory farming and not wishing 
to have to suffer with the thought that this immoral 
activity is being tolerated. But contractors cannot be in 
this frame of mind. Moral judgments depend on the 
outcome of the contractors' deliberations, and therefore 
cannot enter into their deliberations behind the veil of 
ignorance. Ifwe are careful to take account of this point, 
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then we have only the avoidance of the emotional charge 
involved in direct confrontation to worry about; and 
this is taken care of by a prohibition that draws the line 
where Carruthers wants it, I.e., between public and 
nonpublic cases. l 
Boonin-Vail may reply that even the distress of 
thinking about factory farm animal pain without any 
moral suppositions would be believed by contractors 
to be enough to take steps to avoid. I have not proved 
that this isn't so. I do think, however, that we need more 
argument to convince us, since there does seem to be a 
general rule that what is done out of sight is far less 
distressing that what we cannot avoid seeing. 
Let us turn to the second argument. This centers on 
the idea that contractors might agree to prohibit 
mistreatment of animals from a motive of cruelty, 
because they worry that people who have a habit of 
disregarding animal suffering will be insensitive to pain 
in other humans. Carruthers wishes to allow this 
consideration to have some force, but regards this force 
as limited. To draw this limit, he needs to distinguish 
between knowingly causing pain in animals from a 
motive of cruelty and knowingly causing pain in animals 
as a result of activities that stem from other motives. I 
have been unable to find a perfectly satisfactory way 
of abbreviating the arms of this distinction, but one is 
surely needed and I have adopted the pair: brutality and 
indifference. Using these abbreviations, we can state 
Carruthers' position this way: Contractors have 
something significant to fear from people who exhibit 
brutality and they will therefore agree to rules that 
discourage it; but they have little or nothing to worry 
about from those who are merely indifferent, so they 
will not agree to rules that discourage mere indifference. 
Factory farming involves indifference, but not brutality. 
Therefore, contractors will not agree to rules that would 
prohibit factory farming. 
Boonin-Vail seeks to undercut this distinction. There 
are more points made than I can review in detail, but 
the general direction is this. First, let us distinguish 
between nontrivial indifference and trivial indifference. 
Nontrivial indifference, as I shall understand it, occurs 
when the motive for the action that produces animal 
pain is nontrivial; trivial indifference occurs when the 
motive is trivial. Briefly, but correctly to the best of my 
belief, Boonin-Vail's thought is that, while nontrivial 
indifference may be pardonable, trivial indifference is 
a serious moral flaw, which contractors would agree to 
avoid for the same reason they would want to avoid 
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brutality. Factory farming involves trivial indifference; 
therefore, contractors would prohibit it. Remember that 
trivial indifference does not mean a low degree of 
indifference, or indifference to a trivial amount of 
suffering; it means that the motives of the action are 
trivial. The motives for factory farming are trivial, 
argues Boonin-Vail, because, again very briefly, there 
are equally satisfactory alternatives that will not produce 
comparable suffering and will enable humans to satisfy 
their needs. 
This seems very plausible, because indifference to 
suffering is a serious moral flaw. Unfortunately, 
however, it is not legitimate to introduce this plain fact 
into the contractors' deliberations. We must not say, as 
Boonin-Vail does, that "the question which the rational 
contractors behind the veil of ignorance must face is 
precisely whether it would be best that this be the sort 
of world in which they live" unless it is clear that moral 
considerations are excluded from what is meant by the 
"best." We should not represent contractors as interested 
in "moral superiority" (as Boonin-Vail does). The reason 
is the same as before: What is moral is not determinate 
until after the contractors have finished agreeing. 
If we adhere austerely to the contractualist point of 
view, we must consider only this question: Would 
contractors believe that they have as much to fear from 
people whose characters have been influenced by 
engaging in factory farming as they do from those 
whose characters have been influenced by a general 
acceptance of brutality toward animals? This is a 
psychological question for which psychological 
evidence would be appropriate. I do not think that 
Boonin-Vail has established that it is reasonable to 
suppose that the two cases are at all comparable; and 
so, I do not think he has established that contractors 
would be likely to treat them similarly. I have not, of 
course, disproved the claim that the cases are similar in 
their character effects, nor can I do so. However, 
although I have no evidence for this whatsoever, I 
nonetheless suspect that there are factory farmers who 
treat their hunting dogs extremely well and who would 
not tolerate their children's acting otherwise. This makes 
me think that the psychology of factory farmers is 
probably quite different from the psychology of adults 
who, say, severely beat their animals. 
A further argument in Boonin-Vail's second section 
concerns consumers of the products of factory farming. 
I believe that this raises issues that are similar to the 
ones just reviewed. In the interest of time, therefore, let 
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us pass on to the most important of Boonin-Vail's 
arguments, the one that concludes that Carruthers cannot 
maintain a distinction between the moral status accorded 
to animals and that accorded to marginal humans. 
Boonin-Vail's case here is immensely plausible. I shall 
try to restate its essential structure very briefly. Let us 
start with a key distinction to which CarruUlers appeals. 
On the one hand, the regard that we are to have toward 
animals or marginal humans after the veil is lifted is 
direct, that is, harms to them are to be regarded as wrong 
in themselves, not merely instrumentally wrong. On the 
other hand, the justification is indirect: When contractors 
are behind the veil, they will be considering only the 
instrumental value to themselves of adopting this or that 
rule. Now, Boonin-Vail's point can be glossed as follows: 
If we stay behind the veil, the kind of justification that 
we have for our regard for animals is of the same kind as 
the justification that we have for our regard for marginal 
humans (namely, indirect). And, if we lift the veil, then 
the regard we are to have for animals is of the same kind 
as the regard we are to have for humans (nanlely, direct). 
In both cases, there is no principled distinction between 
the situation regarding animals and the situation regarding 
marginal humans. We can get what looks like a principled 
distinction by taking the post-veil lifting point of view 
for one case and Ule pre-veil lifting point of view for the 
other; but, of course, that is cheating. (Besides, if we 
allowed comparison from the different points of view, 
we could come out with animals having a fuller status 
Ulan marginal humans!) 
NoneUleless, I believe that there is a way of sailing 
between the Scylla of over-regard for animals and the 
Charybdis of under-regard for marginal humans. This 
way is to agree that in both cases we have indirect 
justifications for direct attitudes of regard but to hold 
that what I shall call the content of those direct attitudes 
may differ. The best way I can Ulink of to make this 
clear is to imagine two different rules that contractors 
behind the veil might propose to be adopted and instilled 
in their children as fundamental principles. Of course, 
as Uley are still behind Ule veil, Uley preface each 
proposal with Ule statement that, as rational agents, Uley 
all ought to agree to promote Ule rule being offered 
because its adoption is in Uleir interest. But WHAT Uley 
propose is different in each case. Namely, Uley propose 
for adoption, 
(H) Marginal humans intrinsically possess Ule same 
human rights as normal humans, and 
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(A) Cruelty to animals for no further purpose is 
intrinsically evil. 
Despite Ule fact Ulat Ulese rules both embody a direct 
attitude and have the same (indirect) kind of 
justification, they differ in what they enjoin. For 
example, (H) disallows termination of life, (painless) 
castration, and use in medical experiments; (A) does 
not disallow any of these, so long as they are done 
without unnecessary pain. There is therefore a sense in 
which (H) accords full moral standing to marginal 
humans, while (A) does not accord full moral standing 
to animals.2 
I have not, of course, proved that principles (H) and 
(A) are principles that contractors would adopt. My 
conclusion is only that we have not been shown that 
things could not turn out Ulis way; and, if they did, 
animals would have some intrinsic moral status, but 
not full moral standing. 
As I implied at the outset, I do not think Ule upshot 
of these remarks will be that everyone will want to go 
out and become a contractualist. Nonetheless, I do think 
that if one does adopt contractualism, it may be more 
defensible than Boonin-Vail believes. 
Notes 
1 I add two ca~es that I take to support the point here, and 
that may come up in discussion, but that I don't think I will 
have time to read. 
I. Homosexuality case. A person could think that gay 
rights ought to be protected, but still dislike 
witnessing two men kissing. (For that matter, a 
heterosexual person could feel uncomfortable at 
witnessing pUblic displays of heterosexual 
affection.) So, I think there's a big difference 
between the distress one might have at witnessing 
homosexual acts and the distress one might have at 
contemplating them-Le., since one of these 
reactions can occur without the other, their sources 
are different even when both are present. Further, 
the only reason I can see for being distressed by 
private sexual acts, that is, acts where the witnessing 
is absent, depends on the belief that they are 
immoral; which, as I've said in the text, is not 
something we can legitimately introduce if we hew 
to the contractualist background assumption. 
2. Erotophiles like explicit, erotic photographs; 
erotophobes dislike seeing them. My friends in 
psychology tell me there are both kinds of people. 
We can easily imagine an erotophile who thinks 
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"I'd be a better person if I weren't turned on by 
these pictures; after all, the personalities, which are 
what really ought to count in eroticism, are not 
represented." We can also imagine an erotophobe 
who thinks 'These are natural human activities, I 
would be a better person if I related more positively 
to this material." That is, morality may crosscut the 
witnessing reaction. Again, it is only the analogue 
of the witnessing reaction that is properly included 
in the contractors' deliberations. 
2 The question arises whether the suggested way of 
maintaining a distinction between the cases of animals and 
marginal humans can be attributed to Carruthers. It is true 
that he does not crisply distinguish content of principies from 
type of justification and type of attitude that goes with them. 
Nonetheless, I think (but shall not argue in any detail) that 
my discussion is quite in accord with Carruthers' views. I 
note that in P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), the pages from 110 to 
118, which deal mostly with marginal humans, are filled with 
talk about rights. The section on animals and character (pp. 
153-156) is, by contrast, focused upon cruelty and sympathy. 
A notable exception occurs near the beginning of p. 154. Here, 
however, the kind of wrongness that cruelty to animals has, 
and that is to be further discussed in this section, is explicitly 
contrasted with Violation of rights. 
Reply 
David Boonin-Vail 
Tulane University 
I take the general thesis of Professor Robinson's 
comments to be this: in conceding so much to Carruthers 
for the sake of the argument, I have provided the 
contractarian with sufficient grounds on which to 
overcome the initially plausible-looking objections I 
have raised (or at least I have failed to show that I 
haven't provided such grounds). In keeping with the 
spirit of his comments, then, I will limit myself here to 
the narrow question of whether Robinson has succeeded 
in hoisting me not so much with my own petard, as 
with the one I have tentatively accepted on loan from 
the contractarian. 
I. 
My first argument maintained that if the contracting 
agents would decide to avoid the risk ofbeing distressed 
by the sight of animals suffering for trivial reasons in 
public, then they would also decide to avoid the risk of 
being distressed by their knowledge that animals are 
suffering for trivial reasons in private. Robinson's 
objection, I think, can best be summarized in the form 
ofa dilemma: either I am relying on there being a moral 
aversion to this suffering, in which case I am reneging 
on my commitment to argue the issue on the 
contractarian's own terms, or I am appealing to a 
nonmoral aversion, in which case I have failed to 
account for the fact that, in general, what is done out of 
sight is less emotionally distressing than what is done 
in full view. 
I will focus on the first hom of the dilemma and 
make a brief comment about the second. With respect 
to the first, I think that there is a way for me to appeal 
to the existence of a moral aversion to private animal 
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